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Section 31 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides that admissions are not conclusive proof but may operate as estoppels. This section gives the evidentiary value of admissions containing in Sections 17 to 30 of the Evidence Act.
Admission defined under section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is a statement that is declared orally or documentary or contained in the electronic form made by any person in the matter of fact in issue or relevant fact.
Admission by party to the proceeding or his agent, section 18 of the Indian Evidence Act states that any person deriving the statement by the party to the proceeding or agent of the parties whom the court authorized unless statement made by party interested in subject matter or person from whom interest derived.
Section 19 of the Indian evidence act 1872, that the statement made by persons whose position or liability, it is necessary to prove against any party as admissions.
Section 20 of the Indian evidence act,1872 referred for information in reference to a matter in dispute are admissions by persons to the party in the suit.
Section 21 of the Indian evidence act 1872- Proof of admissions against persons making them, and by or on their behalf.
Sec 22 of the Indian Evidence Act,1872- Oral admissions as to the content of a document are not relevant unless and until the party proves to give secondary evidence of documents under the rules contained or question to be produced.
Sec 23 of the Indian Evidence Act,1872 -Admissions in civil cases is irrelevant unless and until the parties express that evidence of it is not to be given, or else the court can conclude that the parties decided not to give the evidence.
Sec 24 of the Indian Evidence Act,1872 – Confession caused by inducement, threat, or promise, when irrelevant in a criminal proceeding
Sec 25 of the Indian Evidence Act,1872 – Confession to police officer not to be proved
Sec 26 of the Indian Evidence Act,1872 -Confession by accused while in the custody of police not to be proved against him unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate shall be proved
Sec 27 of the Indian Evidence Act,1872 – How much information received from the accused may be proved
Sec 28 of the Indian Evidence Act,1872- Confession made after removal of impression caused by inducement, threat, or promise relevant
Sec 29 of the Indian Evidence Act,1872 – Confession otherwise relevant not to become irrelevant because of the promise of secrecy, etc.
Sec 30 of the Indian Evidence Act,1872- Consideration of proved confession affecting person making it and others jointly under trial for the same offense.

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Section 31 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 reads as follows: “admissions are not conclusive proof but may operate as estoppel”. Firstly, understanding of this section requires some basic knowledge about ‘admissions’, ‘conclusive proof’, and ‘estoppel’. So, Admission- as given under section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act means all statements, given by any persons, either orally or in written which has the capability of developing inference as to the facts-in-issue or relevant facts. The usage of ‘any persons’ needs further clarification and that can be extorted from section 18 of the Indian Evidence Act, which says persons includes parties of the proceedings, agents of parties (whom the court regards as authorized), party of representative character (authorized), any person with interest in the subject-matter of the case, and person from whom interest derived. Next, the concept of Conclusive Proof in evidence law. Normally in a civil/criminal court practice, there are three stages involved in admitting a fact as proof. In the first stage, all facts are considered as ‘not proved’ and then as ‘proved’ and finally as ‘disproved’. So, in case of facts that are statutorily proven and when that is claimed by either party, court is obligated to stop the process in the second stage itself. To be precise, when facts of such nature are proved before courts, the opposite party gets no opportunity to rebut or disprove it. Thus, the inference drawn out of these two definitions is that “admission by one party to a suit can be disproved by the other”.
Then comes the chief concern as to the usage of the word – estoppel. General understanding of estoppel is that it is the rule that prohibits a person from making contradictions as to his previous actions and statements. But, when it comes to Evidence law, estoppel, having the above-said definition as a base, got shaped in an exclusive way (for reference section 115 of IEA). Yet our point of discussion does not require interpretation of definition provision on estoppel. Therefore Section 31 of the Indian Evidence Act has used the term estoppel generally, yet not loosely.
The word ‘estoppel’ is not loosely used here because it insisted on the need for further explanation when we say admissions are substantive proof of evidence and are not conclusive proof as well. There comes the question can statements given under section 31, be withdrawn by the same person who gave such admission. Answer to this question is inbuilt in the phrase “may operate as estoppel”. Insertion of the word ‘may’ make the estoppel condition non-

stringent, wherefore not all admissions or in other words not under all circumstances admissions are irreplaceable. Thus, one who gives admission can withdraw or claim it to have been wrongly made before the person to whom it was made starts believing and thereby acts upon it. And it is also upon the court to admit the same, partly or wholly. Since admissions are substantive evidences, do not make itself admissible. Besides, it is to be understood that usage of ‘may’ does not encourage dishonest and false admissions for which stricter interpretation and sometimes harmonious constructions are required depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case.

REFERENCE

1. Indian Evidence Act 1872 § 31, §17, § 18, § 115.
2. VEPA P. SARATHI, LAW OF EVIDENCE 120 (7th ed. 2017)
3. Rengasami Reddiar vs M K Mummachi Reddiar (2002) 1 MLJ 760
4. Ambati Durgamma and ors. vs Pericherla Jagapathiraju 2005 (1) ALD 607
5. D. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Peda Venkaiah 1998 (2) ALT 513

~ Manimozhi Balakrishnan

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When an act done by several persons in furtherance of common intention then are each
of them liable?
Section 34 of IPC reads as, “Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention:-
When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all,
each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone”.
The word ‘Common Intention’ means unity of purpose or meeting of minds or evil intent to
commit a criminal act.
According to section 34 of IPC, it actually means that if two or more persons are intentionally
involved in doing a criminal act jointly, the liability is just the same as if each of them has done

it individually. When a criminal act is done in furtherance of Common Intention of the person
who join in committing the crime, each one of them will be liable under section 34 of IPC.

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In the case of Mohan Singh versus State of Punjab AIR 1963, SC 174 observed that the common intention required by Section 34 of IPC is different from the same intention or similar intention.

To constitute common intention it is necessary that, the intention of each one of them has to be known to the rest of the others and shared by them, whereas in the case of the same or similar intention their intentions are not shared.

Common intention presupposes the prior concert and also implies pre-arranged plans where the act is done in furtherance of the common intention but in case of the same intention it is not the result of the preconcerted plans and the people having similar intention cannot be held guilty for criminal act with aid of section 34.

LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 34:

Section 34 of IPC imposes criminal liability in doing the act with the common intention and the persons who are actually involved in committing a criminal act and who facilitated do such act are equally liable under section 34 whereas in the similar intention the persons having a similar intention and have committed the criminal act are not liable equally but are punished according to the nature of the act.

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Jagan gope and others Vs State of West Bengal
In this case, Abodh Gope, who was headmaster of Sirkadih Primary School was murder by Jagan Gope, Bhadru Gope, Jishi Gope, and Ajit Gope in the school in the afternoon. The incident was witnessed by Mathur Gope and he informed Abodh Gope’s brother and son about it. After they went to school and found Abodh Gope dead. Manoj Kumar Gope(son) and his uncle were going towards the police station but in between Sasthi Gope and Ashadhan Gope had threatened them. Written complaints were filed at the local police station. Based on the evidence Ld. Additional session judge convicted all six accused in the murder of Abodh Gope. But Hon’ble High court of Calcutta upheld the conviction and sentence and says that common intention cannot be confused with a similar intention. Although accused persons may have similar intention to commit a crime, say murder, until and unless the pre-requisites of (a) pre-consent, (b) presence, and (c) participation in respect of each accused are established, it cannot be said that they shared common intention and be culpable for the crime committed by any of them in furtherance to such intention. Sasthi Gope and Ashadhana Gope may have similar intentions as they also had issues with Abodh Gope but they had just tried to be hurdle while Manoj Kumar Gope (son) and his uncle were going to file the case. There is no evidence on record that they were present in school while Abodh Gope’s murder was done by Jagan Gope, Bhadru Gope, Jishi Gope, and Ajit Gope. They may have a similar intention but not a common intention. So when the intention is known and shared is called common intention i.e., A and B had planned and murdered C with common intention, and when the intention is same but not known and shared by anyone is called same intention or similar intention i.e., A and B want to kill C and B murdered C they share same intention, not the common intention.

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Section 34 IPC can be summed up as: if an act is done by more than 1 person, that too in furtherance of a common intention, every such person involved would be liable as if the act was done by him/her alone. The section specifically mentions the presence of a common intention of all involved in the act, for the criminal act to fall under section 34 IPC. Here, arises a need to differentiate between common intention & same intention, and to keep in mind the 2 terms cannot be used interchangeably. Common intention implies that there has to be a pre-arranged plan, there has to be a prior meeting of mind of all participating in the act. This is not the case with Same intention. Similar intention does not necessarily mean that there is a pre-decided plan that is to be executed. There also does not exist any prior meeting of mind.
Let us understand this with an example, Sherlock & Watson have a feeling of animosity towards a guy called Ford who runs a bar named Hitchhiker’s Galaxy down the street. One fine day Sherlock goes with a sickle, down to the bar and runs the sickle across the throat of Ford. Watson on the other hand had no idea of the same. The above crime scene involves Sherlock alone, whereas Watson shares only a similar feeling of animosity with Sherlock towards Ford. There is no prior arrangement of the plan to kill Ford between Sherlock & Watson. So we can say Watson & Sherlock have a similar intention towards Ford, but they have no common intention of the same. There is no prior meeting of mind before Sherlock carried out the killing, in fact Watson had no idea of the same. Thus assuming the situation takes place in India, section 34 will not be attracted as there is no act done in furtherance of a common intention. Sherlock alone will be liable for killing Ford. Now here is a situation where Section 34 is attracted, here, Sherlock & Watson had a pre-decided and arranged plan to kill Ford. Sherlock goes inside the bar kills Ford, & Watson is sitting in the Security room looking and informing Sherlock of the happenings around the bar. Now, because there is prior meeting of mind and the act is done in furtherance of a common intention section 34 is applied. The fact that Watson is not present at the crime scene is of no significance and does not affect the attraction of section 34.
Thus, common intention & similar intention are different terms. To the answer the question specifically, No, the element of common intention does not require the presence of similar intention, as similar intention is not enough to attract section 34. Something more than same intention is required. Therefore, common intention is a step ahead of similar intention.

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In the absence of any contract to that effect, an agent cannot personally enforce contracts entered
into by him on behalf of his principal, nor is he personally bound by them. Presumption of contract to contrary, Such a contract shall be presumed to exist in the following case,
where the principal, though disclosed, cannot be sued.
Meaning:
The term disclosed principal means, A principal whose identity is known to the third party at the
time the agent makes a contract for the principal with that third party. Section 230(3) of the Act suggests that when the principal is disclosed and the principal cannot be sued. And then there is a
presumption that the agent is personally liable According to this act. If it is satisfied then Section
233 of the Contract Act gives the option to the party to sue as the agent/principal and both. But,
the condition precedent is that the case should fall under Section 230(3) of the Contract Act.
Therefore, what is important here is that it must be established that the principal cannot be sued
in this particular matter.

In Travancore National Bank Subsidiary Co., Ltd.(in liquidation) and another, [1943(1) MLJ
425], the principal being an unregistered union cannot be sued, the Court held that by virtue of
Section 230(3) of the Contract Act agent can be made personally liable.

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To understand the clause, it is important to look at the clause in the light of the neighbouring provisions. Under section 227 if the agent exceeds their scope of authority, the principal will not be liable for such acts of the agent. Section 228 provides that in case the act that falls within the scope of authority of the agent can be separated from what is beyond it, the principal is only bound by that which is an authorised act; Section 229 on the other hand provides that in case the act that falls within the scope of authority and that which is beyond it cannot be separated the principal cannot be liable. So, a disclosed principal cannot be sued if the two acts are not separable as under Section 229 and Section 227 if the act of the agent isn’t authorised or is beyond his course of employment or the agent acts in personal capacity as under Section 236. Furthermore, if a person untruly represents himself as an authorised agent and deals with a third party in that respect and his alleged employer refuses to ratify his acts, such person, under Section 235 is personally liable, this is another instance when a disclosed principal cannot be sued.
In the case of Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v Moreshwar Parashram and Ors., the court held that the contract is not properly drafted and thus the principal cannot be sued and to ratify a government contract is up to the government if the same is for the benefit. If the government doesn’t ratify the same, the principal in that case though disclosed cannot be sued. The statutory provision in this case was seen as a means to safeguard the government from unauthorised contracts or those that are in excess of authority. The observations of the court in this case with respect to the application of Section 230(3) of the Indian Contract Act emanated from J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co. Ltd. V King Emperor where the court opined that inconvenience and injustice to innocent persons and simultaneously safeguard the Government.
Thus, the essence of the third clause in the stated provision is in the neighbouring sections namely Section 227, 228, 229, 235, 236 of the Indian Contract Act.

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1. PRELIMINARY INQUIRY.
• Section 157 of Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (CrPc) deals with the procedure of the preliminary inquiry.
• The objective of preliminary inquiry is to ensure that a criminal investigation process is not initiated as a frivolous and untenable complaint.
• A preliminary inquiry is only done to ascertain whether the information reveals the commission of cognizable offenses (A cognizable offense is one in which the police may arrest a person without a warrant. They are authorized to start an investigation into a cognizable case on their own and do not require any orders from the court to do so)
• If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offense, FIR must be registered.

2. FIR (FIRST INFORMATION REPORT)
• Section 154 of Code of Criminal Procedure,1973(CrPc) defines what amounts to the first information
• FIR is a written document prepared by the police when they receive information about the commission of the cognizable offense.
• FIR can be formed without preliminary inquiry in some of the offenses.
• Mandatory information disclosed indicated the commission of cognizable offenses.
• FIR is mandatory for the offenses to proceed with the investigation.

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Preliminary enquiry means,
if the information given by the complainant does not reveal
or disclose the commission of a cognizable offence by any person, but indicates the need
for an inquiry, preliminary inquiry may be conducted, for the sole purpose of ascertaining if the commission of a cognizable offence is taken place or not.

FIR means,
In case the preliminary inquiry discloses that a cognizable offence has been
committed then an FIR must be registered. In case the preliminary inquiry ends up in
closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of this closure must be supplied to the first
informant forthwith and not later than a week. The same must lay out reasons in brief for not proceeding further on behalf of the complainants complaint. Registering the FIR is mandatory if information disclosed indicates the commission of any cognizable offence. The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering the offence if a cognizable offence is disclosed in the preliminary enquiry. With regard to the erring officers who do not
register the FIR on the information for commission of cognizable offence as received,
legal actions can be taken against them.

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Section 415 of the Indian Penal code states the definition of ‘cheating’. It says, ‘Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”’.
Deceiving hereby means, representing yourself to be someone different to avail undue benefit from it, thus causing harm to the deceived. Representing something as yours which is not and getting undue benefit out of it. Pretending to not know a fact that a person knows to be true so as to tend to his selfish interests. Intentionally hiding something or a part of a story. Lying and making the opponent believe that I will keep up to my promise without any intention of doing so. Breaking someone’s trust. These are the things that come under ‘deceiving’ in the definition of cheating.
In short, giving someone a false hope with the use of wrongful methods such as lying or hiding facts or committing a fraud to unduly benefit out of them for the selfish interests is deceiving.
Let’s take an example that will combine all of these for our better understanding. Ramesh is a law student but he represents himself as his friend Amay who is a law graduate. He then applies for a job in a law-firm and gets accepted. Due to some personal issues between him and the employer, he conveys outside the firm that the employer is accepting law students due to which the reputation of the firm is at stake. This is clearly a fraudulent behaviour with dishonest intentions of getting the salary without any proper certification or even though he is incompetent. Also, he puts the reputation of the firm in danger due to personal issues. The employer wouldn’t have agreed to this if it wasn’t for the deceiving. This case is clearly a case of cheating.

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The vocabulary meaning of “deceiving a person” simply means “To deceive means to trick or lie”. However, in legal sense the meaning is much deeper and defined than that. Law bifurcates the essence of the deceiving a person into three categories. For example- A, sold an article to B saying that it is made up of silver when it is not, intentionally deceives him and thus commits the offence of cheating.
First, fraudulently inducing a person, for delivery of a property. According to section 25 of I.P.C. “a person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to defraud but not otherwise.”
Second, dishonestly inducing a person, for retention of property. According to section 24 of I.P.C. “when the doing of any act or not doing of any act causes wrongful gain of property to one person or a wrongful loss of property to a person, the said act is done dishonestly.”
Third, intentionally do something or omit to do and the damage or harm caused due to the act or omission of it. If a person knows that the argument made by another is false, but still acts upon them in order to apprehend that person, the accused may not be guilty of the main crime, but of attempting to commit it.

According to Section 420 of the I.P.C., if a person cheats, he/she is punishable by imprisonment of any description for a period of up to seven years and is also liable to be fined.

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Question: What does “deceiving any person” provided under Section 415 of IPC mean?

“Deceiving any person” is provided under the purview of Section 415 of Indian Penal Code. It is one of the ingredients of “Cheating” other than fraud and dishonesty. Here ‘to deceive’ is the ultimate motive whereas ‘fraudulently’ and ‘dishonestly’ are used to describe the intention. Deceiving contributes to either dishonest misrepresentation or dishonest concealment of factual truth.
Moreover, the meaning of deception, derived from this section is the quintessence of the offence provided in Section 420 of IPC as ‘cheating’ is one of the most essential ingredients to attract section 420. Making a false representation is part of deceiving as well as cheating both in Section 415 and 420 of IPC.
~ Shubhangi Gehlot

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In general language the word ‘deceive’ means ‘to cheat someone’.

Thus, under Section 415 of Indian Penal Code, ‘deceiving any person’ means to make someone to do or not to do something or to induce that person which would result in harm or loss to that person is considered as cheating.

In other words,
A intentionally deceives B into a belief that A means to repay any money that B may lend to him and thereby dishonestly induces B to lend him money. A not intending to repay it. A cheats.
A intentionally make C believe that A has performed his part of work of the contract which A actually didn’t, thereby induces C to perform his part of the contract. Here A cheats

According Sec 420 of IPC when a person cheats, he / she shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
~ Isha Aggarwal

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In easy words deceiving refers to causing to believe what is false, or misleading as to a matter of fact, or leading into error. Hence, whenever an individual fraudulently represents as an existing fact that which is not an existing fact, he commits this offence. A wilful misrepresentation of a definite fact with intent to defraud, cognizable by the sense – as where a seller represents the quantity of coal to be fifteen cwt. and actually is of nine cwt. but so beautifully packed to look amounts to deceiving.
Deception is a vital ingredient for the offence of cheating under both parts of this section. It is therefore, very necessary for the complainant to prove that the inducement had been caused by the deception exercised by the accused. Such deception must necessarily produce the inducement to part with or delivery property, which the complainant would not have parted with or delivered, but from the inducement resulting from deception.
Bu reading of the provision itself, it is very clear that there must be no dishonest concealment of facts. In simple words, non – disclosure of relevant data would also in turn be treated as a mis – representation of facts leading to deception. It is also necessary to prove that the representation was false to the knowledge of the accused and was made in an order to deceive the complainant.
It is not necessary that the false pretence should be made in express words; it can be inferred from all the circumstances attending the obtaining of the property, or from conduct.
When in case an individual has knowledge that the statement made by another are false, but still acts upon them with a view to entrap that person, the accused will be guilty not of the principal offence but of attempt to commit it.
~ Pranjali Pandya

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