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Section 34 and Section 149 deals with the common intention and common object under IPC impose vicarious liability on each individual for acts that are not necessarily done by them. However, there are some differences in the scope and nature of the operation of both offenses.
Section 34 lays down the principle of joint liability, which means the act done by several persons, and the act which are intentional and preplanned. There should be a common intention between the persons committing the act, participation of the person act should lead to an offense under the Indian penal code.
‘Common intent’ in Section 34 has not been clearly defined in the IPC, whereas’ common object’ must be one of the five ingredients defined in Section 141 of the IPC.
‘Participation’ is the main factor in Section 34, but active involvement is not required in section 149 of the IPC. Section 34 requires the common intention of any kind.
If the intention is proved but if there is no action done then this case deals with section 34 vicarious liabilities, but if the person has done the act but he/she has no intention then section 34 cannot be invoked

Under Section 149, If an offense is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offense, is a member of the assembly, is guilty of that offense.
The offense under section 149 is an assembly of five or more members having one objective and there must be an unlawful assembly and acts are taken under for any member of the assembly.
Members of the unlawful assembly should join voluntarily with knowledge of the common object.
The charge is replaced by Section 34 of the IPC, particularly when some of the accused are acquitted and the number of the accused drops below 5.
Section 34 does not constitute a particular offense but sets out only the principle of joint criminal culpability. Whereas Section 149 generates a particular offense and being a member of an unlawful assembly is itself a criminal offense punishable under Section 143.

Section 34 requires some active involvement, particularly in the case of a crime involving physical abuse. Section 149 does not involve active involvement and also the responsibility comes from the mere membership of the unlawful assembly with a common objective

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The distinction between common Intention and Common Object.
The question is related to two different sections of the Indian Penal Code, namely Section 34 and Section 149. Section 34 says “When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.” While Section 149 says “If an offense is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offense, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offense.”
The distinction between the sections can be drawn as:
(i) Section 34 does not constitute a concrete crime; it rather establishes the concept of mutual criminal liability. Whereas a separate crime is created by Section 149 and being a part of an illegal assembly is a criminal offense itself punishable by Section 143, where Section 143 is “Whoever is a member of an unlawful assembly, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.”
(ii) ‘Common purpose’ used in S.34 has not been specified elsewhere in the IPC, although one of the five ingredients defined in Section 141 of the IPC must be ‘common object.’ Section 141 is “An assembly of five or more persons is designated an “unlawful assembly” if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is—
(a) To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, 1[the Central or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State], or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power of such public servant; or
(b) To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or
(c) To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offense; or
(d) By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain possession of any property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or another incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or to enforce any right or supposed right; or
(e) By means of criminal force or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do.
-PREYANSI ANAND DESAI

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The term ‘intention’ is not defined in Indian Penal Code but section 34 of IPC deals with common intention. By the words like “Acts done by several persons” the section refers to “Joint Liability” of individuals. Such acts done with a criminal intention or knowledge despite its commission of several people, will be regarded as if the complete act is done individually. Common intention implies a pre planned and joint ‘acting in concert’(identical actions to accomplish the same goal) to pursue their plan. Though the act was jointly committed but each person would be individually liable for the injury he caused but none would be vicariously liable for the acts of other liable individuals present.
This section does not talk about “Similar intention” as it is different from Common intention. The prior is about absence of pre-planning whereas the Common intention is vis-a-versa. Section 34 can be invoked only when the accused shares common intention and not one the similar intention.
Common object is addressed in Section 149 of IPC creating specific offence of unlawful assembly which is itself a crime under Section 143 comprising five or more members. On the other hand Section 34 does not create any specific offence but lays down the principle of joint criminal liability with minimum two individuals. Similarly, S. 34 is participation and prior meeting of mind is required whereas there is no need of prior consensus ad idem and active participation in S.149 of IPC.

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Aren’t you baffled between Common or Similar?

In common parlance we fail to see and make differences between the words like common and similar, objects and intention. It is Interesting to know that legal parlance not only differentiates but also provide different punishments for slightly distinct offences. The concerned sections are section 34 and section 149. The difference between common intention and common object can be understood with a famous case case study.

Mahbub shah v. Emperor
This case commonly known as Indus river valley case. A person “A” and his friends went up to the stream of river in order to collect reeds. When they were on their way they were warned by M to not proceed to collect reeds from his land. M was father of W. A and his friends ignored the warning and proceed on their way, on their return journey they were blocked by M’s nephew G. He pushed A. To save himself A took the wooden pole whish is used for rowing the boat in his hand. W and M came to help G they were armed with guns. W fired at A and killed him. M fired on A’s friend H. The high court held him guilty for committing murder of A under section 302 and 34 of IPC. The privy council held that the case was in the nature of similar intention and not common intention. Both M and W rushed to save G but their was no meeting of minds.

Meeting of minds is an important factor to differentiate between the two.
Similar intention implies that more than one person thinks same but they have not discussed it and are not doing it collectively. Whereas common intention requires the person to prior meeting of minds and then committing the act.

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Basically the both common intention and common object are joint liability. The basic difference in section 34 makes everybody liable for the offence committed. However, In section 34 (common intention) two or more person are required for the offence.
Section 34 tells that each member should have participated in the act and attending prior meetings together is not necessary.
Section 34,in itsef is not a specific crime and needs active participation whereas section 149 talks about in “common object ” where at least five person are necessary.
Section 149 is a specific crime and makes every member of unlawful assembly liable for being a member of lawful assembly. It makes anybody liable even for being a member and doesn’t require active participation.

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Section 34 of the IPC says that when a criminal act is done by many people in view of an common intention for all, then each of them will be liable for that act done in the same manner has it been done with one person alone. Whereas, the section 149 deals with the act of unlawful assembly which says that if any offence is committed by the members of an unlawful assembly in view of the common aim of that assembly, or such members knew to be likely associated in persecution of that aim, every member who at the time of committing of that offence is member of unlawful assembly, is guilty and punishable for that offence. Section 34 talks in general while section 149 specifically talks about the members of an unlawful assembly.

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Section 34 and Section 149 should never be mixed.

Section 34 of IPC, 1860 is defined as: “Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.”
Meaning – If two or more people commit any criminal offense and with the intent of committing that offense, then each of them will be liable for that act as if they committed the act individually.
This section states that a notion of joint liability, which is present in both civil and criminal law. It addresses a scenario where an offense involves a specific criminal intention or understanding and is committed by multiple persons. Each of those who join the act with such understanding or purpose shall be responsible in the same manner as he/she accomplishes that intention.
Ingredients of Section 34:
• Criminal Act Done By Several Persons
• Common intention
• Participation in The Criminal Act

Section 149 of IPC, 1860 is defined as: “Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object.”
Meaning – where an offense is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in the prosecution of the common purpose of that assembly, or as the members of that assembly knew likely to be committed in the prosecution of that purpose, any person who is a member of the same assembly at the time of the commission of that offense shall be guilty of that offense.
Ingredients of Section 149:
• An offense committed by members of an unlawful assembly
• In prosecution of the common object
• Members knew to be likely
• Five or more persons

Conclusion:
Section 34 merely defines joint liability and does not impose any penalties for the same. Section 34 must be implemented together with some other section in order to make an individual jointly liable for the offense.
Finally, it can be said that both Sections 34 and 149 make an individual vicariously responsible for his companions’ actions. Both sections cannot always be provided by direct proof and shall be inferred from facts and circumstances of the case.

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Sec 34 of Indian Penal Code states, when criminal act done by several persons in furtherance of common intention of all, then each of the persons would be liable for that act as if it was done by him alone. The elements of Sec 34 are:-
• Some Criminal Act
• Criminal Act done by several persons
• Common Intention
• Participation in Criminal Act
• Common Object
In the case of KRIPAL SINGH Vs STATE OF UP, Supreme Court held that common intention may develop on spot. A previous plan is not necessary.
In case of Roy Fernandez Vs State of Goa, Supreme Court held that court is required to see both the circumstances, in which the incident has taken place to determine existence of common object,
Common intention may be of any type but common object under sec 149 must be one of objects under sec 141. Burden of Proof shall be on prosecution to prove :-
• Actual participation of more than 1 person for commission of Criminal Act
• Such act done for the motive of common intention
Therefore, existence of common object is vital ingredient while determining offences under chapter 8 of IPC .For the application of common intention {Sec 34} ,the meeting of minds (pre-arranged plans) between accused persons is necessary but in case of common object { Sec !49} it is sufficient that accused was a member of unlawful assembly while offence was committed. Sec 34 applies when two or more persons including the accused do a criminal act and must therefore be present while act is done but in Sec 149 it applies only when there is an unlawful assembly of five or more persons.
Therefore, concept of common intention is different from common object under the provision of Indian Penal Code.

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As per section 34 of Indian Penal code, 1860, following things need to be considered-
(1) There sholud be a criminal act.
(2) The number is not being fixed but it should be more than one. Here, the word several is used which shows that the person can be two or many.
(3) The act should be done in furtherance of common intention which means that the intention is being communicated to all the person whoc are being involved in the commission of the same act and the intenion needs to be fulfilled in any way. For the fulfilment of the intention, one may do any act which may be similar to the others or distinct from the others.
(4) The word ‘common intention of all’ is being used in the provision which makes it clear that the intention of all the persons should be one. All should do the act in the furtherance of that intention which implies acting in concert.
(5) Each person shall be held liable for the act done in the same manner as it it were done by him alone.
In the cases of common intention, the intention could be predetermined and it can be developed on the spot also. For making person liable under this section, it is much needed that the act must be done in the furtherance of the common intention who join in commiting the crime. For liabilty, the physical presence of such persons is necessary.
Section 149 deals with the common object. For the purpose of this section, there must be an unlawful assembly and if any member of such unlawful assembly commit any office in prosecution of the common object of that assembly then every persons who are the members of that assembly during the commission the crime is held to be guilty of that offence.
Thus, the person committing the offence in furtherance of common object is not only be held liable under this section but all the persons who are the members of that unlawful assembly. Here, physical presence is not necessary but mere member of the assembly is enough to held person liable. All the persons need to do the offence but commission of the offence by a single person is enough. The offence must be done in pursuance of the common object or knowledge. The common object can’t be developed instantaneouly or on the spot. It needs to be circulated among the members of the group.

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Section 83 of the Indian Penal Code confers immunity to children up to the age of 12 from criminal liability. Now, when a child is above the age of 7 and below the age of 12, the liability is completely dependent on the maturity of the child. Which means, the maturity of the child will be taken into consideration before deciding the liability of the child. This will establish whether the child is innocent or liable for the crime.
A definite question that arises here is, how to determine whether the child is mature enough or not? Few factors that demonstrate maturity are – the immediate action of the child after commitment of the act, the conduct and behaviour of the child during the investigation process, the nature and intensity of the criminal act committed by the child.
Therefore, ‘Nothing is an offence which is done by a child above seven years of age and under twelve, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion.’ There is only a partial defence for criminal liability under this age group because it is based on the principle of “doli capax”.
The age of the child is given only a little attention while attending to this. It should be proved beyond any reasonable doubt that the child had ‘mens rea’ while committing the actus reas.
In a case where a child below 12 repeats a criminal act, it may be concluded that the child has attained maturity and hence, he/she can be liable for the criminal act because he/she has repeated it. But it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The conduct of the child is the only way that can make us aware in this situation. Because an act can be repeated without having enough maturity and conscientious regarding it.

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Section 82 and 83 of Indian Penal Code considers for criminal acts to the children upto 12 years. In section 82 is act of a child under 7 years of age i.e., offence done by a child under 7 years of age and section 83 act of a child above seven and under 12 of immature understanding where offence done by child is not considered as unlawful.
In this way, the question decides its duty not on its age, but rather on its development at the time the wrongdoing was perpetrated. Accordingly, it is significant for the respondent to establish that the guilty party was not just under 12 years old at the time the wrongdoing was perpetrated, yet additionally didn’t arrive at the degree of development expected to comprehend the nature and results of his activities.
The comprehension of childhood and advancement will be relevant with respect to the sentence to be passed against him in the event of his conviction. Incidentally, the thought of things being what they are, for instance, people up to 18 years of age, is as of now constrained by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015. After the Nirbhaya Rape case, an age get-together of 16-18 was made to treat the liable gatherings of terrible offenses, having a spot with this age pack as adults.

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In the latest judgment ‘Shilpa Mittal V. State of NCT of Delhi’ (2020) 2 SCC 787; the Supreme Court stated that the framers of the Legislation did not take into consideration the fourth category offences. ‘How and in what manner a juvenile who commits such offences should be dealt with was something that the Legislature should have clearly spelt out in the Act.’
Considering the fact that the object of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is that children should be protected and treating children as adults is an exception to the rule; the Hon’ble Court remarked that the Fourth category of offences i.e. offence where the maximum sentence is more than 7 years imprisonment, but no minimum sentence or minimum sentence of less than 7 years is provided, shall be treated as ‘serious offences’ within the meaning of the Act until the Parliament takes the call on the matter.

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No, the Bailee will not be liable for the loss of good if he has taken reasonable care of goods as a ordinary man of prudence in the similar circumstance will take care of his own goods as mentioned in the Section 151 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
In the Case of Union of India v. Udho Ram and sons, the respondent consigned some goods to the railway department. The goods were lost before reaching the actual destination. The respondent filed the suit against the railway authorities for the loss of the goods caused. The suit was dismissed by the trial court and it said that the railway authority took proper care of the goods and the reason for the loss was beyond the control of railway authorities. The present suit went to appeal in Supreme court of India. It was held that- The railway authority was not able to show an evidence which could prove that they acted according to Section 151. Thus, they are liable for the loss caused to the respondent because of their negligence.
If bailee has entered into a special contract then he has to abide by the terms and condition of the contract and took the care of the goods as mentioned in the contract. The standard of care to be taken can be maximized or minimized by the special contract and then on that basis the liability of the bailee will be examined. But if no such contract is signed than in such a condition bailee will not be liable for any loss, destruction or deterioration to the thing bailed if he has taken care of the goods as mentioned in the Section 151 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

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A bailee cannot be sued for not delivering goods to the real owner as he, in good faith, assumes another to be the real owner. This can be established by the following—
 Section 166 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872- If the bailee returns back to the bailor and it is subsequently established that the bailor had no title to the goods in practice, the bailee is not responsible to return the goods to the actual owner. It is necessary that the act were done in good faith and the bailee acted upon the directions of the bailor.
 Section 117 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872- The bailee cannot be permitted to deny that the bailor had the authority to make such bailment at the time when the bailment commenced. It is somewhat implied that the bailee should accept the title of the bailor over the goods when he delivers the goods for bailment. It is further explained that if the bailee delivers the goods not to the bailor but to some other person, the duty lies upon him to prove that the person had a right to the goods against the bailor.
 Section 167 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872- If some person other than the bailor demands delivery of goods from the bailee, he has the option of applying to the court to stop the delivery of the goods to the bailor and decide the title of the goods.
Therefore, the bailee cannot be held responsible for not delivering goods to the real owner as he assumes another person to be the real owner in good faith.

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A bailee is an individual who gets temporary possession of the goods for the purpose of repair. A bailor is a person who gives temporary possession of the goods for the purpose of repair. It is to be noted that the bailee receives only the possession of the goods and not the complete ownership. And the act of giving away the temporary possession of the goods is called bailment. The given question is related to Section 166 of the Indian Contract Act. According to Section 166 of the Indian Contract Act 1872, “Bailee not responsible on re-delivery to bailor without a title.”
According to the interpretation from the above statement, it can be said that if the bailee delivers the goods to the fraud bailor in good faith then he cannot be blamed for such delivery by the real bailor but can be blamed if he knows that the false bailor is misrepresenting and still delivers the goods. It can also be said that if the goods are delivered upon the instructions of the bailor then the bailee cannot be blamed.
For example, A gave her necklace to QPR Jewelers for some repair work for three days. In this case, A is the bailor and QPR Jewelers is the bailee and the bailment between them is repairing the necklace and returning it after three days. After three days, B came to collect the necklace on behalf of A by misrepresenting herself and the bailee was not aware of the same and in good faith delivered it to B. Hence, QPR Jewelers cannot be sued by A for mistakenly delivering the goods.
Another example can be, A gave his car for service to DEF garage for three days. In this case, A is the bailor and DEF garage is the bailee and the bailment between them is servicing the car and returning it back after three days. After three days, C came to collect the car of A misrepresenting himself and the DEF garage was aware of the misrepresentation but still delivered it to C. In this case, A being the bailor and the act of bailee not being in good faith can sue the bailee DEF garage.

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